University of Memphis

University of Memphis Digital Commons
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
4-25-2021

Argentine Dependency, Devaluation, and Default: a Study of
Argentina's Economic Crises from 2001 to the Present
Jacob Matthew Pollock

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Pollock, Jacob Matthew, "Argentine Dependency, Devaluation, and Default: a Study of Argentina's
Economic Crises from 2001 to the Present" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2161.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd/2161

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by University of Memphis Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of
Memphis Digital Commons. For more information, please contact khggerty@memphis.edu.

ARGENTINE DEPENDENCY, DEVALUATION, AND DEFAULT:
A STUDY OF ARGENTINA’S ECONOMIC CRISES FROM 2001 TO THE PRESENT
by
Jacob Matthew Pollock

A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Major: Political Science

The University of Memphis
May 2021

Abstract
Global financial structures and domestic monetary policy are inextricably intertwined and
difficult to understand. Latin America has garnered significant attention from scholars concerned
with the relationship between currency, economic policy, and global structures, as the region has
suffered significant and regular financial and monetary crises since the 1970s. The scholarly
debate continues to consider the most important factors of economic crises in Latin America.
Some argue domestic factors and poor policy choices by national governments explain the bulk
of the crises, while others emphasize international power structures as playing an outsized role.
Employing dependency theory, I investigate the relationship between Argentina’s many
economic crises, the global financial system, and its principal actors. Global financial structures
play a significant part in the financial maladies of developing countries, as evidenced by case
studies of Argentina from 2001 to the present.
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Donald Duck, Dependency, and Default
“Donald Duck is an agent of imperialism” (Perez 1990; 133). The raspy duck, a staple
Disney character, likely would not garner such criticism from many outside the United States
today; However, scholars of Latin American development began writing on patterns of cultural
and economic influences coming from the US in the 1960s (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978;
Weeks 1981; Chirot and Hall 1982; Perez 1990; Blaney 1996; also see Uche 1994). American
culture, embodied in its media through characters like Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, sent
American ideals abroad, such as the goodness of capitalism and the threat of socialism (Perez
1990). To respond, authors and activists needed a systematic approach to studying the influence
of the global North on the South, which spurred dependency studies. But the issue of exporting
influence is significantly more systemic than popular culture; indeed, pop culture demonstrates a
superficial dependency on US entertainment and media. But scholars have chronicled
dependence on US-led institutions in a variety of other more serious ways, including banking,
finance, and credit, which greatly affect state-and-region development (Pauly 1998; Bhalla
2008). Dependency theory is both a reaction to and a critique of a vast array of influences that
the developed world pushes on developing countries.
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971, which largely regulated the
flow of money throughout the world, created new ways for rich countries to “financialize” and
become hubs of lending huge amounts of money (Krippner 2005). This arguably changed the
dynamics of dependency of the underdeveloped on the developed. Now, credit could be extended
from the global North into the global South. With credit came speculation and, sometimes,
financial ruin. International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund
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(IMF) and World Bank began implementing programs to save indebted and financially broken
developing countries, though it often came at a heavy political and economic cost.
These international organizations, particularly the IMF, have undergone reforms to better
help struggling target countries after years of criticisms that they focused on supporting
established markets of the North. But the effectiveness of these reforms have been contested,
with some arguing that the end-goal of US-backed IFIs being primarily to benefit US economic
interests has not changed (Lesage et al. 2013). There exists a theoretical and practical gap in the
literature between work on monetary theory, development, and dependency of US-backed
international institutions. While I argue that structuralists who study currency (like Jeffry Frieden
and Susan Strange) use much of the same vocabulary as dependency theorists, a true dependency
lens has yet to be well applied to issues of currency and debt policies, especially when
underdeveloped countries are most dependent on foreign credit and bond issuance.
This thesis aims to pull from a few fields of literature to better understand
underdeveloped regions’ dependency on global North credit. By building case studies of
Argentine debt crises from 2001 and 2014, I aim to better understand whether global South
dependency on Northern-backed IOs has diminished, gotten worse, or stayed largely the same. I
plan to do this by building case studies of monetary crises in Argentina from these different
periods after 1971, comparing how much IOs constrained policy choices of elected leaders in the
wake of those crises in exchange for credit and international support. The rest of this chapter
covers relevant literature on pertinent topics, such as monetary theory, the post-Bretton Woods
era, and dependency theory. Then, a discussion of the cases selected for analysis and a brief
trajectory of where those findings ought to lead.
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Relevant Literature
The study of money and power is not new. Pioneering scholars such as Susan Strange set
out early to ask questions of money and structure (Strange 1990). She identified different types
of currency based on how powerful they are on the world stage (Cohen 2019; Strange 1990).
While the US dollar has remained the dominant currency after World War II, other currencies
hold regional or even international significance. However, smaller currencies, like those in Latin
America, often function more as a hindrance to development, as they either must be pegged to a
stable, international currency, or ride the waves of shocks experienced alongside financial crises.
The last fifty years have been a tumultuous time for the world’s smaller currencies. And
no region has been more dynamic, or suffered more currency related turmoil, than Latin
America. Since the 1971 breakdown of Bretton Woods reprioritized currency policy on a
national and international scale, countries have scrambled to find policy solutions to myriad
money woes. In response, the developed world has funded institutions, such as the IMF and
World Bank, to lend a hand – and lend money – when underdeveloped countries run out of
policy options.
Although developing countries and smaller economies have relied heavily on these
international institutions for help developing economically and mitigating financial crises, there
is a paucity of literature that links what we know about currency theory and policy with
dependence on international institutions. Importantly, our understanding of how, if at all, these
institutions circumscribe policy options to countries undergoing both development and acute
financial crises. The following pages review the literature on currency theory, financial crises,
and dependency theory. A theory of currency policy constraint is then discussed before a
delineation of two case studies that aim to investigate the theory in action.
3

Bretton Woods and a Changing View of Dependency
After World War II, the Bretton Woods agreement governed the international monetary
system. The policy trilemma, in which countries can choose two of three options (stable
exchange rates, monetary policy autonomy, and free flow of capital), saw the first two prioritized
over the flow of capital under Bretton Woods. Stable exchange rates meant that the US dollar,
the leading world currency, would be pegged to the price of gold, and that other countries could
not easily devalue their own currency for short-term boosts to exports. This stability in
currencies arguably sustained and prolonged the postwar economic boom across much of the
world (Williamson 1985). Bretton Woods was not perfect, however, and scholars have
contentiously debated whether we tend to give the policy choices during the Bretton Woods
period too much credit for the stability and growth enjoyed (Felix 1998).
Somewhat unsurprisingly, it was President Nixon’s discontent with the inflexibility of the
US dollar pegged to gold that saw the eventual collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in
1971. The US thought the burgeoning trade deficit, in which emerging economies were selling
cheap products to the US, was especially problematic. If the US dollar could be devalued, then
the trade deficit might self-correct (James 2012, 423). That thinking was, by all accounts, quite
faulty. However, untethering the dollar from gold did shift the global monetary regime away
from the most important facet of Bretton Woods – stable exchange rates – and instead, ushered
in the free flow of capital and national monetary sovereignty as the global monetary policies of
choice. This change upended the way developing countries could do business. They now had to
worry about the stability of their own currencies, faced with tough decisions about monetary
policy decisions and no longer unbothered by the de facto stable exchange rate regime that was
previously enjoyed by everyone.
4

The breakdown of Bretton Woods created two new situations that are pertinent to this
article. First, many countries gained new autonomy in creating national currency policy.
Exchange rate stability under the Bretton Woods agreement meant that countries were unable to
manipulate their fixed exchange rates. Once the US dollar became a true fiat currency, many
smaller currencies then could strengthen or weaken their currency against the dollar (Aglietta
2019). Second, the 1970s saw a flood of freshly printed dollars on the world market (Meese
1990). Private and central banks found themselves awash in cash and needing to lend some of
those dollars out – as any financial guru would say, make your money work for you. These two
new issues create a peculiar situation for smaller countries. They could now borrow
tremendously large sums of money in the form of US dollars and manipulate the value of their
own currencies against those dollars.
It should be noted here that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system led to a surge in
political economists reexamining dependency theories, as researchers argued whether Bretton
Woods and the ensuing globalization narrative contributed to interdependence of countries or
financial dependency of the Global South onto the Global North (Garrett 1998, 795). It is worth
noting that the field was reenergized by the post-Bretton Woods era, and that scholarship could
lend itself to better understanding the monetary theory behind developing countries, especially if
we consider how the dominant policy decisions made by the US might constrain the choices
made by smaller countries. My research seeks to shed more light on how developing countries
are dependent on developed-world monetary regimes (Felix 1998). Certainly, the innerworkings
of the Bretton Woods agreement gave the US outsized influence in global monetary policy;
however, fixing the US dollar to gold limited the degree to which the US could engage in
currency statecraft, or using its currency to achieve diplomatic goals (Cohen 2019). With the
5

current regime (or mixed regimes), the policy options of developing countries against the
constraints of the most powerful currency issuers makes for compelling and important research.
Louis Pauly’s Who Elected the Bankers? (1997) is a cautionary description of where the
world financial system stood and where it was heading. Pauly saw the globalization of markets
as centralizing economic power in the financial institutions and corporations of the most
powerful countries. Groups like the World Bank, IMF, and U.S. Federal Reserve providing
monitoring and oversight of shaky financial markets was, to Pauly, an important temporary fix to
swiftly globalizing markets and shifting power structures, but it would not work forever (Pauly
1997, 121). Instead, elite economic interests in the Global North would choose stability at home
over stability abroad (namely in the Global South) and developing countries would eventually
pay the price. Pauly accurately saw that in the post-Bretton Woods world, major financial
decisions were more commonly being made by unelected financiers, deeply insulated from
public opinion and democratic process. Therefore, he surmised that as all markets amalgamated
into one large global mess, mostly elite, unelected financial gurus would control monetary policy
and thus reap the benefits of globalization. Because of this, Pauly ends his book with a warning
and a prediction:
Beyond the leading industrial states, future shifts in economic power will likely
complicate the process of international adjustment…. Even the citizens of leading states
will rightly begin asking why they must defer to decisions over which they are losing
control, and why the political authorities responsible to them are becoming impotent. At
that point, the retreat from global markets will begin (143).
Pauly is not alone in his thinking. Around the same time, other scholars posited that there
was an emerging issue with national politics and international markets. The Bretton Woods
6

agreement constrained economic liberalism and allowed the best qualities of internationalizing
markets to flourish while limiting risky economic activity and preserving state sovereignty. In
the post-Bretton Woods world, those qualities have reversed, and we now experience with
regularity those issues that the agreement sought to constrain (Garrett 1998). In other words, the
separation between elected leaders in national government and supranational market and
financial systems that Pauly and others warned about has been realized.
Subsequent work considers a globalized United States as “financialized,” creating a more
complicated relationship between the corporation and the state (Krippner 2005). The debate
centers on whether financial institutions hold more power over financial policy than the state, as
Pauly might suggest, or whether the state maintains a necessary level of control over broad
economic policy. While this debate is compelling and important, it is largely centered on the
United States and the rest of the developed world. And while the argument is a push-and-pull
between government and business, there is little argument that the power is concentrated in a few
developed countries, namely the United States. The question is whether the US government or
US financial groups hold more power over broad economic policy, but the debate does not travel
well.
Currency Theory and Financial Crises
Few scholars of political science have taken on the task of understanding and explaining
monetary policy theory. Even fewer have attempted to tie these theories to concrete examples.
As noted, monetary policy theory is not well understood by using economic models. Instead,
political science is especially well equipped to understand the social, political, and technical
aspects of monetary theory and subsequent policy. In the simplest sense, small countries have
few questions they must answer: do we “fix” our currency or allow it to float relative to others?
7

Should our currency be relatively strong or weak? Do we allow our exchange rate to function as
a non-tariff barrier? And how much inflation can our economy (and our voters) tolerate (Broz
and Frieden 2001)? Each of these questions can get significantly more complex than a
dichotomous choice (i.e., fixed, or floating), and the political ramifications of the results of these
policies are eminently important. But if monetary policy were a truly economic issue, political
science might not have much to add. Instead, the work of economists is notably inconclusive on
what currency regimes are best for which countries: “… so even here there are few purely
economic factors that could explain national government policy” (Broz and Frieden 2001, 319).
Frieden’s later book, Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy
(2015), synthesizes much of what we know about monetary policy today. Frieden spends a
portion of the book building a description of the modern history of monetary policy, from the
gold standard to Bretton Woods, to our current situation. He also considers how electoral politics
and national party coalition building maps onto currency politics. His book, taken as the most
complete account of currency politics available for consumption, lends direction to fresh
research questions. Toward the end of his book, Frieden considers why Latin American countries
choose certain monetary regimes and what contributes to frequent currency crises in the region.
Throughout various books and journal articles, Latin American countries or the entire region are
often chosen as case studies because of the multitude of currency crises that have occurred since
the 1970s (Aglietta 2016). While Frieden runs a few regression analyses to look at broad
economic trends against currency regimes, his book does not aim to develop a thick description
of the international politics or grand power structures surrounding development and currency
policies for the countries or years he has chosen. Instead, he is simply bolstering theoretical
points made earlier in the book through macroeconomic data analysis.
8

While Frieden has built a helpful description of monetary policy choices, there are still
phenomena that countries encounter that have no clear policy answers. Balance of payments
crises happen frequently, especially in smaller countries (Krugman 1979; Cottani, Cavallo, and
Khan 1990; Thirlwall 1997; Moreno-Brid 1998; Kaelberer 2014). While balance of payments
(BOP) crises are the most common, they may look different across different countries at different
times. Furthermore, BOP crises can be especially hard to predict, as econometric models have a
difficult time understanding what initiates the crisis: “It is, of course, impossible to measure the
seriousness of a country’s balance-of-payments situation independent of the level of employment
and output (or a country’s growth rate in a dynamic context)” (Thirlwall 1997, 378). While
Thirlwall considered the economistic issues of examining BOP crises, politically-oriented
scholars such as Frieden might argue that these crises are different due to the various, shifting
political pressures on state financial institutions – including the electoral pressure for short-term
versus long-term monetary fixes (Broz and Frieden 2001).
Certainly, BOP crises which lead to debt defaults are the temporal parameters of my
proposed research. I intend to study Argentina leading up to, during, and after such crises to
better understand the monetary policy options that smaller countries can employ and the political
pressures, both internally and externally, that constrain them. But countries large and small might
not see their currencies only as an economic mechanism that they must keep in equilibrium.
Instead, currency might be its own tool of political leverage, both domestically and
internationally (Cohen 2015; Cohen 2019). While currency statecraft might not be the central
focus of my thesis, the extant literature on the political leverage of currency is an important
aspect in understanding how deeply political money can be. At this stage of research, intuition

9

hints that monetary policy choices and the associated crises, especially in small states, are driven
more by politics than economics.
There are a variety of financial crises that can beset a country or market – banking,
balance of payments, debt, currency, speculative, and so on. When a country slips into any of
these crises, it is extremely common for the national currency to suffer if it is on a floating
exchange rate – i.e., not pegged to a stable currency (Frieden 2015). This is important for two
reasons. One, it means that regions that suffer financial crises of all kinds frequently – like Latin
America – also suffer parallel monetary crises. And two, along with whatever underlying issue
the country faces – like a balance of payments imbalance – there is also an immediate currency
valuation issue that must be stabilized.
Development Literature and Monetary Policy
Development scholarship is a significantly more developed field than is monetary policy
research. However, there is some important overlap between work on national-level economic
development and monetary policy. Some of Broz and Frieden’s (2001) earlier questions have
been rigorously explored. For example, one pressing question is whether the undervaluation of
currency necessarily speeds along development. There is some limited support for this
hypothesis (Bhalla 2008; Rodrik 2008); however, the literature overall is mixed. A variety of
research methods lend support to different theories (Subramanian 2010), with some research
suggesting currency undervaluation improves domestic savings and employment but has no
effect on a country’s GDP (Gluzmann et al. 2012).
These empirical analyses are helpful and will likely prove to be important throughout the
course of process tracing financial crises. But these works cannot explain the variation in

10

domestic political processes or the explicit policy choices pursued by national governments or
central banks, because they do not consider the specific and practical policy options available to
countries given the potentially significant number of constraints on policymakers. These studies
will prove helpful, however, in understanding how research matches up against actual decisions
made, and how those decisions either cut across the research or align with it. Furthermore,
process tracing allows us to see if there are adverse consequences to policymakers and bankers
choosing options that are not aligned with the academic research.
Another interesting exchange rate field of study in development literature is whether
exchange rate manipulation and public debt affect development in countries or regions, as was
the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (Clever 1985). For this, the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other institutions
publish a variety of scholarship specific to regions and countries that are undergoing particularly
difficult economic situations. These studies can be important for two reasons. First, studies that
look specifically at the country I am studying are perhaps directly applicable in forming
descriptions and inferences. Second, studies of other regions and countries might shed light on
patterns that are then applicable spatially and temporally. Researchers have already used threads
of information that run throughout Latin America and Asia to describe larger patterns in
monetary policy issues (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998).
Finally, the conversation surrounding the strength of the economy versus the strength of
the currency is important. Blomberg, Frieden, and Stein (2005) find that development in Latin
America has made pegged exchange rates politically costly, as economic interest groups seek to
capitalize export potential on a floating currency regime. Furthermore, the authors note the pushand-pull forces between consumer and trader interest groups, arguing for greater purchasing
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power and easier exporting regimes, respectively. As previously mentioned, Latin America is a
prime area to study currency policy decision making because of the dynamic currency changes
over the last half century. Other scholars argue that Latin American countries may have fallen
prey to worrying about the “middle,” in which they adjust exchange rates based on a mix of
short-term and long-term economic forecasts, which can be detrimental to satisfying the
previously discussed “trilemma” (Willett 2007; Frankel 2004). This is yet another reason why
process tracing specific cases are important. Willett (2007) notes the importance of exchange
rates to satisfy short-term balance of payments disequilibrium, which may shift policy focus so
far away from long-term growth that a country is more easily thrown into a large economic crisis
with currency policy as one of the root causes.
The weak/strong currency – weak/strong economy nexus is rather important to
understand and is probably best described and understood through process tracing. In the 1990s,
a development-minded Japan dealt with a chronically strong Yen (Schnabl 2001). As previously
discussed, developing countries oftentimes attempt to undervalue (or even devalue) their
currency to give them an edge when exporting goods. The Yen suffered from overvaluation for a
variety of reasons. Schnabl’s (2001) chronicling of the 1990s Yen lends support to the argument
that the valuation of a currency holds specific meaning to individual countries. Schnabl (2001)
argues that Japanese development in the 1990s likely looked different from other countries
precisely because of the overvalued Yen. Japanese investors at many points in the decade chose
to keep their money at home instead of investing in US dollars or other currencies, which likely
had an influence on the movement of capital into and within the country.
As will be explored in chapter two, Argentina pegged its own currency to the US dollar at
the rate of 1:1, which led to a real appreciation of the Argentine peso as the dollar climbed
12

throughout the 1990s. therefore, the theory behind strong and weak currencies is especially
important as we consider the effects that a stronger peso may have had on the Argentine
economy leading up the first financial crisis we will investigate.
The International Monetary Fund, Latin America, and Financial Crises
While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) takes on a variety of tasks, it has been
highly interested in exchange rate stability ever since volatility in exchange rates have existed
(Bilson 1978). While some economists, like Bilson, have sought a generalizable theory of
exchange rate stability based on developed-world currencies, other IMF analysts have blamed
domestic politics for shifts in currency value (Pastor 1989). As previously noted, there has been
much attention paid to the electoral consequences of currency policy, especially in Latin
America (e.g., Broz and Frieden 2001). Democratically elected officials must satisfy various
coalitions, which might entail manipulating the strength of their currency. While domestic
factors are certainly crucial to understand the issue of currency crises holistically, the
international factors are just as complex and functionally important.
When the dissolution of Bretton Woods broke the dam of US dollars and flooded
international markets, Latin America enjoyed easy access to American and European credit. As
economic downturns in the 1980s reverberated throughout the world, formerly free-flowing
rivers of credit from the North began to run dry, and Latin America was forced to make good on
its debts without access to more cash (Pastor 1989; 82). The new cash markets created after
Bretton Woods reinvented the way countries could borrow. While domestic factors are certainly
a piece of the problem for countries with balance of payments and sovereign debt issues, the
reinvention of world credit cannot be understated.
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Materialist critiques argue that the central focus of the IMF is to maintain hegemonic
global financial structures (Mueller 2011). The new financial markets of the 1970s were a boon
for the lenders; however, someone needed to be tasked with stabilizing the debtors when
problems would arise. The IMF, in its goal to “stabilize” the world financial system, maintains
the flow of credit from the developed to the underdeveloped. While neoliberals might argue,
from a rational choice perspective, that underdeveloped regions ought to take these loans,
especially if domestic politics are to blame for financial failures, the underlying goals of the IMF
are important in understanding the outcome of so many IMF programs. Dreher and Jensen
(2007) find that IMF loan policies are greatly affected by the receiving country’s relationship
with the United States. Countries that voted more consistently with the US in the United Nations
received fewer conditions on their loans (121). This bolsters the case that 1. Loan conditionality
is not motivated to achieve positive outcomes for countries, but possibly about punishing
countries or forcing them to abide by economic standards set at the behest of foreign powers with
skin in the game and 2. Structural and materialist critiques of the IMF hold significant
explanatory power and deserve to be interrogated with various methods.
While the IMF has blamed currency and debt crises on domestic political factors, doing
business with the Fund can itself hold negative political repercussions. Democratically elected
leaders shy away from taking IMF deals when they perceive a possibility of the program failing
(Williams 2011). Instead, elected executive leaders opt to “go it alone” for fear of losing the next
election. As we will see in the next chapters, Argentina was no stranger to political turmoil as
IMF programs failed and the country fell deeper into economic crises.
Dependency Theory
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The study of money is both broad and complex. Economists and political scientists have
investigated an array of national and international issues relating to money, including balance of
payments crises, the politics of exchange rate changes, and currency as a political leveraging
tool. The vernacular of currency theorists, however, overlaps with that of dependency theorists.
The reality is that the currency situation of one country and the broader context of worldwide
currency politics is an issue of world structure (Pauly 1998). Why have we not studied money
through the lens of world structure?
As Perez (1990) notes, dependency theory finds its roots in Latin American socialist
activism and scholarship. The tumultuous political and social situation of Latin America in the
1960s gave rise to a new broad school of thought: “In its most usable form, dependency theory
establishes the relationship between development and underdevelopment as the context in which
to examine relations between the United States and Latin America” (Perez 1990: 135). Thus,
dependency theory is an inherently Latin American perspective, developed by scholars who
sought answers for the societal issues they saw at home. While there are several lenses through
which scholars can develop theories on Latin American currency politics and development,
dependency theory offers a unique perspective which brings to the forefront global structures
that play an outsized role in the development of countries and regions. The assumptions
underlying dependency theory create a framework for utilizing current research on Latin
American-specific development and currency literature to better understand how these global
structures restrict critical decision-making and create path-dependent approaches to policy
formation in the face of financial crisis on the continent.
Dependency theory enjoyed a relatively short lifespan at the forefront of political science
and sociology. However, the theory lends unique perspectives important in understanding the
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constraints on monetary policy in Latin America, especially in the wake of acute financial crisis.
First, I address the main theoretical assumptions of dependency theory. Then, I discuss how it
differs from alternative approaches. Afterwards, I consider common critiques of dependency
theory and its necessary limitations as an approach to monetary policy analysis.
Assumptions and Criticisms
The theory is not without its critics. Gabriel Almond referred to dependency theory as
“intellectually counterproductive” (1990: 253) because it largely ignores domestic factors of
underdevelopment. Cultural theorists such as Almond decry both its origins and assumptions.
And given its relatively short time span as a widely discussed theory, one could assume it was
shelved because of inconsistencies or bad assumptions at its core. This is not true. Dependency
theory may have died out not because it is theoretically unhelpful or “counterproductive,” but
because it was placed on the shelf for other, more trendy theoretical approaches (Blaney 1996).
Moreover, it overlaps with Marxist and materialist perspectives frequently, but is distinct from
them in several ways. The distinctions may not be obvious enough for the casual reader of
dependency theorists to grasp, thus leading some scholars to collapse the two theories into one,
ignoring dependency theory as a kind of offshoot of Marxism.
But as Weeks (1981) explains, the two are quite different. While Marxism and
materialism concern themselves predominately with the exploitative nature of class structures,
dependency theory is a varied school of thought with several branches, though all are concerned
in some capacity with the dependency of the underdeveloped world on the developed. Capitalism
and postcolonialism gave rise to a shifting of resources from the colonial world into the
economic centers. If capitalism is concerned with capital accumulation, dependency theory
recognizes the accumulation of capital in the developed regions, due in part to extractive
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practices of the developed world on the underdeveloped. Marxism envisions class struggles as
the heart of political and economic struggles, which transcends borders, cultures, and institutions.
Dependency theory considers in the world as made up of regions, divided by their relative
development, with the lesser developed regions dependent on the more developed. Dependency
theorists also recognize that this system is not by accident: it is lucrative for the developed
regions to function in this way (Uche 1994).
The assumptions within dependency theory, as noted by Valenzuela and Valenzuela
(1978), contrast starkly with other popular approaches. Namely, modernization theory considers
the value systems and social structures of countries in considering why development does or
does not occur; however, modernization theory is often bereft of supranational structural
considerations. A theory that does not consider the major shifts in world economic power
distributions likely lacks explanatory power when studying countries with rich recent economic
histories. The stories and data that should be unpacked to offer a clearer picture of Latin
American development deserve a proper treatment, and dependency theory is but one theory of
many that ought to be thoroughly utilized in better understanding the plight of the continent.
Furthermore, modernization theory relies heavily on assumptions of social psychology
and behavioral science that sometimes make assumptions on a certain people’s or culture’s
fitness to modernize (Blaney 1996; Chirot and Hall 1982). Such a theory is problematic on its
face and unhelpful for the goals of this article.
The theory comes with its own set of challenges. Not long after dependency theory began
to take hold in academia, proponents of modernization theory discounted its validity as being too
politically driven and unconcerned with other important variables, such as mass political
behavior (Blaney 1996). But the aim of dependency theory is different from modernization
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theory. At its core, it is a structural theory, concerned with understanding the externally induced
constraints on growth and development.
The literature on currency theory and policy shares much in common with dependency
theory, though it has not been well explicated in the various seminal currency texts. For example,
Louis Pauly’s “Who Elected the Bankers” considers how global financial decisions in the postBretton Woods world have shifted from elected leaders to unelected financiers. Pauly
understands and explains the dependency of many underdeveloped nations on international
organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund. Such a dependency does not exist
among developed states, such as the US.
Dependency of Monetary Policy
National monetary policy deserves the treatment of dependency theory. As noted earlier.
Structural theories generally applied to topics of global currency and finance issues, especially in
the context of globalization, are helpful. However, they do not emphasize the dependency of the
underdeveloped regions on the developed world. While dependency theory may not currently be
a vogue critical lens through which scholars are studying current issues, the works of Wallerstein
and others ought to be pulled off the shelf and dusted off so that a fresh angle is applied to a
recurring problem.
Dependency theory has several strengths specific to its employment in currency crises
and international organizations. The theory does not consider with the same degree of specificity
of modernization theory a country or region’s social variables in developing. It does however
consider that there are internal and external factors that work in tandem to determine how
dependency on developed “hubs” of the world affect developed elsewhere. The well-developed
literature on electoral considerations of currency policy in Latin America help to build a case for
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the internal factors of dependency (e.g., Broz and Frieden 2001). A systematic investigation of
the linkages between the IOs that may circumscribe policy options of countries in crises should
begin to build a better account of the external factors of dependency. This is especially true since
much of the currency policy work, as mentioned, as been conducted through a structuralist lens,
albeit not one that explicates an obvious case of dependency.
Research Method
I intend to use process tracing to better understand currency crises in Latin America from
before and after the 2009 financial crisis, after the IMF allegedly reformed itself. In doing so,
Argentina presents an interesting case to study, as the country has experienced multiple currency
crises in the last several decades (Rapoza 2020). And as mentioned, Latin America generally
serves as a common area of focus on scholarship concerning financial crises generally, as the
region was hard hit by a variety of economic shocks in the 1970s and 80s (Aglietta 2016; Frieden
2015). My sources will be newspapers and other news media, firsthand accounts like blog posts,
and institutional reports and papers (such as from the IMF, NBER, etc.). From a simple, brief
review of such materials, it is apparent that there is no lack of these materials on the internet.
To better understand the policy choices made and the policy choices available to these
countries in recent currency crises, I intend to rigorously apply process tracing as a research
method. According to David Collier (2011), process tracing is a qualitative research method
applied mostly to within-group analyses that aim to (1) build a thick description of a single or
recurring event and (2) explore causal mechanisms. To work, the method must first understand
that describing processes over a series of time only works if the researcher can provide clear,
deep description of multiple points in time (Collier 2011, 824).
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These specific events for each Argentinian crisis will likely comprise several different
kinds of political and economic events that make up smaller processes. Broz and Freiden (2001)
noted that political pressures in electoral democracies might cause more pressure to shift
currency policy, but sound process tracing that incorporates the description of electoral events
alongside other pertinent happenings could shed significantly more light on their assumption.
Macroeconomic trends and shocks (like the 2009 world financial crisis), NGO and especially IO
actions, domestic political events, war and insurrection, and natural disasters are all likely
important events to describe the lead up to and time during a monetary crisis, especially in a
region that appears to chronically suffer from them.
Because this thesis is limited on space, domestic political factors will not be as rigorously
investigated as they might be when employing other theoretical lenses. Instead, since this study
is using dependency theory as a starting point, the process tracing will focus predominately on
Argentina’s interaction with world structures, namely IFIs and the United States federal court
system.
Based on preliminary reading and research, two big points stand out. First, the study of
economics clarifies the technical ramifications of currency policy, but it is unable to grasp the
relevant political information that is necessary to deepen our understanding. Second, political
science is well-equipped to do good work, but there has been an overall lack of attention paid to
currency policy theory and practice, especially from a qualitative standpoint. My intuition is that
there are a mix of social, political, and economic factors that play into the process of monetary
policy implementation, especially in times of crisis. For example, the economic factors that work
on the valuation of currency, mixed with the political and social issues of trust in currencies and
the stability of countries, must be explored within a qualitative analysis. Within the stability of
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the country and the political institutions, issues like right-leaning populism (which has
influenced Brazil since before the election of Jair Bolsonaro) likely play a role in how outside
investors look at the Brazilian market and how financial institutions within the country operate.
Process tracing allows for the description of several forces acting on currency policy at once,
while gaining the description necessary for good causal inference.
An important piece of the process tracing procedure is the evaluation of the crisis by the
IMF and other lenders and the subsequent conditionalities placed on loans, and whether
Argentina decides to take those loans and conditions. As previously noted, the IMF tends to lend
with fewer conditions based on a country’s voting agreement with the United States in the UN
General Assembly (Dreher and Jensen 2007). To understand dependency on US-led institutions,
mapping and explaining US actions relative to the currency crises of Argentina in time is an
important aspect of understanding the bigger picture of external factors of dependency.
Earlier cases of currency crises in Argentina are likely going to show an obvious
dependency on US institutions through loan extension and restructuring. We understand that
conditionalities on loans in the 1970s and 80s were particularly harsh, and that adjustments
implemented due to those conditionalities were oftentimes painful. However, the real
explanatory power in this project will lie in understanding whether the IMF and World Bank,
fully understanding the drawbacks of severe conditionality, adjusted their own policies
accordingly after 2009. Using dependency theory as a lens can help us to understand whether
these IOs are chiefly concerned with the recovery and development of Latin America or
upholding the economic and political goals of the United States abroad.

21

Argentina in Crisis: Convertibility and Collapse
In December 2001, the Argentine economy began to collapse. After weathering multiple
regional and international economic emergencies throughout the 1990s, the Argentines found
themselves in a severe balance of payments crisis, illiquid domestic capital markets, and no lines
of international credit to service their increasing deficits. Argentina was one of Latin America’s
fastest growing economies during the previous decade, despite significant economic shocks for
its neighbors and largest trading partners. It outperformed neighbors and most developing
countries throughout the world. In March 2001, months before the economic panic began, an
IMF publication acknowledged Argentina as a success story in an otherwise unstable region,
calling on other Latin American countries to follow suit. Nine months later, all would come
crashing down.
The situation worsened from late 2001 into 2002. In December of 2001, protestors took
to the streets. A run on the banks began when word spread that the Argentine peso might be
devalued, and banks were running out of foreign-denominated bills. The national government
then limited cash withdrawals and froze foreign-denominated assets. Argentina was, by any
measure, dealing with an economic, political, and social disaster – one that would draw out for
years, leaving researchers to ask how it happened and how it could have been avoided (Sharma
2002). To understand the crisis of 2001/2002, one first must look at Argentina in the 1980s, the
politics of hyperinflation, and the policy choices that built a complex and compounding set of
issues that all came crashing down.
Latin America experienced significant episodes of hyperinflation throughout the 1980s.
the discourse surrounding the cause of the inflation and the possible policy options is greatly
debated. Of course, we can look at what happened to cause inflation and what those countries did
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– with or without international support – to stabilize, but it is difficult to argue counterfactuals, or
what would have happened had countries chosen different paths. Instead, there is enough to
examine in the rich literature on Latin American economics and politics that shows diverging
fields of thought regarding the role of international structures in stabilizing and developing the
region.
There is a wide gap in the literature, despite different authors discussing the same subject.
Critical researchers prod at the structures and constraints that were placed on Latin American
democracies. Institutional views – like those of the IMF and World Bank – frame the same issues
in different contexts, sometimes downplaying their own institutions’ involvement in economic
disasters that got worse after international help arrived (e.g., the “Tequila Crisis”). Despite
reluctancy to discuss how politically involved international financial institutions (IFIs)
sometimes are (e.g., IMF 2004), scholars have exhaustively documented the panoply of political
relationships woven through the U.S. government, the IMF, the World Bank, and Latin
American countries (e.g., see Teichman 2004; Dreher 2002). While the IMF and World Bank
helped to stabilize the otherwise dire fiscal and economic situation of Argentina in the late
1980s, they also helped to set the country on a path to eventual disaster through a development
plan that relied on unsustainable currency and debt policies.
While the 1970s saw increased capital inflows into Latin America, the 1980s brought on
economic crises throughout the region, leaving countries no other option than to take on IMF and
World Bank loans and the associated structural adjustments, typically in the form of market
liberalization (Pastor 1989; 82).
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Argentine Hyperinflation and Monetary Restructuring
Transitioning from a military dictatorship to a populist national government, Argentina
took on heterodox fiscal policies in the 1980s: ignoring the budget deficit, expanding domestic
spending, and controlling consumer prices. In turn, the country quickly spun into inertial
hyperinflation (Cardoso 1989; 17-18). The economy was in a tailspin, and the international credit
and capital that existed throughout the 1970s because of the post-Bretton Woods dynamics began
to dry up over falling investor confidence. The “extra dollars” that materialized after 1971, and
heavily marketed to developing countries, became scarce. Once Argentina realized the extent of
its inflationary issues, it was too late to secure enough foreign-denominated money to correct the
problem, not that private lenders would have taken on such risky debt anyway.
Manuel Pastor (1989) notes that two fields of thought developed in assessing the issue of
Argentine hyperinflation. While the IMF and World Bank blamed mostly domestic policies (e.g.,
populist heterodoxy) for the creation of hyperinflation, leftist critics noted the massive influx of
capital in the 1970s proceeded by the recoiling of that same capital in the 1980s. As chapter one
noted, dependency theory does not discount the internal factors that lead to dependency or create
problems that dependency may also create. Here, the literature argues both ways, with
institutions placing blame on the countries, and some leftist critics placing blame on those
institutions.
Private creditors sought out Latin American countries for borrowing in the 1970s, and in
keeping up with the race to develop, many of those countries took on debt without a long-term
plan to repay it (Pastor 1989; 88). The same debt crisis that was arguably initiated by private
creditors over lending was then exacerbated when private banks were no longer willing to
renegotiate the restructuring of existing debt or to continue to extend credit to indebted countries.
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While the Fund was largely avoided throughout the 1970s, the mounting crisis of the 1980s
meant that the “lender of last resort,” the Fund, found itself in the driver seat, directing capital
flows between the global North and Latin America.
Different structural adjustment policies (SAPs) were sought for different countries in
Latin America by the IMF throughout the 1980s. It is unclear exactly how much the Fund guided
Argentina on its path to recovery in the late 1980s through 1991, but Argentina’s decisions to
restructure, no matter who ultimately chose them, were officially supported by the IMF (Onis
2006; IMF 1995). The Argentine peso was introduced in 1991, replacing the nearly worthless
austral, and by 1992 achieved 1-to-1 convertibility with the United States dollar. Throughout the
1990s, the Fund praised the convertibility regime, noting the rigid peg to the dollar to be a highly
stable currency policy with few drawbacks (IMF 1995, 2003a).
The convertibility plan, to be overseen by the new Currency Board, was to take decision
making power away from the Argentine national government, essentially fixing the new peso to
the dollar: “The Convertibility Plan and its institutional counterpart, the Currency Board, were
implemented by the Argentinean authorities through close collaboration with the IMF” (Onis
2006; 243). Of all the structural reforms in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, Argentina’s
convertibility plan is one of the most debated. Orthodox economists, such as those at the IMF,
saw the fixed currency as a boon to development; outside investors could again inject capital into
the country without the fear of currency devaluation. Furthermore, Argentinians could hold
dollars or pesos, as there was no fluctuation in the exchange rate – indeed, there was not an
exchange rate at all.
While convertibility might be “a rather less extreme form of dollarization” (Vernengo
and Bradbury 2011), it functioned in Argentina’s case in much the same way. Dollarization is
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simply when a country abandons its own currency and decides to use the US dollar or another
currency as its own. It eliminates exchange rates without a “home” currency and eliminates the
need for a central bank in many cases. Several countries attempted dollarization throughout the
late 20th century, and several countries use the US dollar exclusively or alongside their own
currency (Aglietta 2016).
1990s Argentina: Manufactured Prosperity under the Convertibility Plan
Once the convertibility plan set currency policy in 1991, economic growth took off.
Argentina enjoyed strong growth marked by international capital flowing into the country. But
while the GDP went from contracting 7% in 1989 to booming 9% in 1991 (World Bank Data
Report), the “growth” period from 1991-1998 was significantly more tumultuous than a simple
story of linear growth. The “Tequila Effect” coming from a speculation crash in Mexico in 1995
left Argentina in a currency bind. It is important to understand how the shock from Mexico
would play as a foreboding episode to the 1998 downturn and subsequent crash of 2001 –
predominately due to the IFI-backed convertibility regime.
In 1995, the IMF released an extensive report titled Capital Account Convertibility:
Review of Experience and Implications for IMF Policies. The team of researchers who wrote the
report were led by Peter J. Quirk and Owen Evans, both longtime IMF economists with several
publications on exchange rate regime policy analysis. The report broadly investigated the
different convertibility regimes countries had sustained throughout the last approximately ten
years in the context of capital liberalization throughout the world. It also focused attention on
some countries, including Chile, Turkey, and Argentina. As noted by the IMF, several countries
achieved full currency convertibility in the early 1990s. while the report remained ambivalent to
floating and semi-rigid exchange rates, it described Argentina’s convertibility regime with a
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Currency Board as “… providing a strong institutional commitment to exchange rate stability
and low inflation” (IMF 1995; 17).
One issue with analyzing publications by the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund is that they are exceedingly descriptive, with an almost intentional deemphasis on
prescription, despite both IFIs playing an outsized role in the financial and economic
restructuring of struggling countries. The 1995 publication laments certain actions taken by
countries, especially the capital outflow controls Argentina placed on international institutions
when the financial crisis of 1980 first began (IMF 1995; 21). But other than voicing passive
contempt for policies that are not inherently neoliberal and not dedicated to the free flow of
capital and deregulation of international market dynamics, these publications are especially scant
on analyzing and recognizing complex, country-specific currency and market issues that arise.
Sometimes these issues are despite liberalizing national financial institutions, but some authors,
such as Manuel Pastor (1989) and Diaz-Alejandro (1983), have argued for decades that these
country-specific problems arise exactly because of liberalization forced through these IFIs.
These are important points to remember, as Argentina’s convertibility plan went together
with capital account liberalization in the late 1980s. while Argentina’s convertibility plan aimed
to stabilize the currency and the economy broadly, it is important to investigate the involved
interests and why convertibility, instead of a floating regime, was backed by IFIs. Convertibility
followed other reforms, namely provisions that required greater government oversight and
private firm ratings of investments. Argentina also introduced new reporting and auditing
requirements on international investments during the period of account liberalization (IMF 1995;
18). But as the IMF report notes, Argentina saw growth overall but with several caveats. Banks
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experienced failures to provide basic services, credit lending had to be curbed, and deficits
increased (18-19).
The IMF blamed Argentina’s issues throughout the period of account liberalization on,
unsurprisingly, Argentina. The report stated vaguely that banks “… appear to have reflected
mainly magnified effects of preexisting weaknesses in the structure of banks' balance sheets,
including large volumes of nonperforming loans and insufficient capital, and institutional
weaknesses” (19). The “institutional weaknesses” were not expounded on in the report; however,
the Fund makes no effort to describe the dynamics of capital flows increasing significantly in the
1970s, then drying up a decade later, even though they regularly mention the issues that Latin
American countries had in stabilizing their own growth and currencies throughout the 1980s.
Indeed, by reading the report it becomes clear that the account liberalization efforts that many
countries, including Argentina, underwent in the late 1980s and early 1990s were due mainly to
the hits those same countries took in the earlier 1980s when they no longer had access to
formerly abundant international cash.
The Fund has a knack for framing crises in a certain light. Overspeculation into Mexico
combined with a strong currency brought on a massive panic and reversal of investment inflows
out of the country in 1994 (Calvo 1996; Frieden 2015; Aglietta 2016). But the Fund tends to
reminisce differently. In a 2012 report, it characterized Mexico’s problem not as one of financial
vulnerability, but of an overstrength currency that was inextricably linked to multiple internal
weaknesses (IMF 2012). Calvo (1996) argues instead that Mexico’s problems were inherently
international; that the economy was opened too wide and relied too heavily on international
investment, and that issues the Fund is normally quite worried about, such as balance of
payments crises, paled in comparison to the ruin wrought by overspeculation.
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Mexico devalued their currency in response to the milieu of issues they had. Then, as the
results of Mexico’s troubles rippled throughout the world, researchers began calling the lasting
consequences the “Tequila effect.” Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998), in a World Bank policy
research paper, recognized Argentina as the most affected country by the Tequila crisis after
Mexico, and subsequently celebrated its response. At the behest of the Fund and World Bank,
Argentina remained strongly committed to its convertibility plan and Currency Board. Instead of
devaluing its currency, the country chose to sell off $355 million in foreign-denominated
reserves. As mentioned previously, in the 1995 IMF paper on convertibility, Argentina was
already a troubled case for running deficits since 1991, which the World Bank report noted
become intensified during the Tequila effect. On March 10, 1995, Argentina reached an
agreement with the IMF. The country would take a $7 billion loan and the IMF would “monitor”
Argentine debt levels (Ganapolsky and Schmukler 1998; 10).
Argentina’s situation leading up to the 2001 collapse should start to be easier
contextualized once we understand its priorities and actions throughout the 1990s. I argue that
the striking growth in GDP in Argentina throughout the 1990s is a faulty metric for
understanding the true nature of growth in the country. The country consistently ran budget
deficits. The convertibility plan essentially left no way to alleviate those deficits through regular
currency policies, such as small, temporary devaluations of the currency. Instead, the domestic
economy, while growing in terms of GDP, was suffering in other important ways.
Because the US dollar appreciated significantly throughout the national economic boom
of the 1990s, so too did the Argentine peso (Vernengo and Bradbury 2011). As discussed in
chapter one, an over appreciated currency in a developing country brings with it a set of
significant issues. A strong currency in a developing country makes its exports significantly less
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competitive, as Argentines hold greater purchasing power with a stronger currency but less
ability to sell off goods. Such a situation is one explanation of why Argentina ran up debt
throughout the 1990s, they could purchase easily but not sell easily. Thus, dollars – or pesos –
were leaving the country faster than they were coming in. As noted, Argentina continued to
finance this imbalance through fiscal debt: “Argentina was left with a twin-deficit, current
account and fiscal debt, that undermined both debt and currency sustainability” (Vernengo and
Bradbury 2011; 449). Essentially, Argentina bore the brunt of the Tequila Effect because of the
convertibility regime. Other countries, such as Chile, saw worsening capital outflows in similar
fashion, but had currency policy options, such as short-term devaluation, that allowed them to
take on the crisis without taking out loans (Calvo 1996). Furthermore, the same bank
“vulnerability” that the IMF pinned on Argentina in 1991 (IMF 1995) was linked to the
relationship between convertibility and banking during the Mexico crisis: “Furthermore, bank
vulnerability was higher in Argentina … because Argentina is committed to a currency board
which limits the central bank’s ability to operate as lender of last resort, whereas the other
countries have made much less binding monetary/exchange rate policy commitments” (Calvo
1996; 210).
Despite all of this, Argentina remained committed to the convertibility plan. The IMF
continued to extend more money to the country in exchange for the continuation of the currency
regime. Throughout various interviews and expert panels by both IFIs and Washington-based
think tanks, it is not apparent that anyone was advocating for Argentina to abandon the
convertibility plan and devalue the peso against the dollar. In an interview with the New York
Times in 1995, Argentina’s finance minister Domingo Cavallo stated: “How can you devalue if
you are ready to have the whole economy functioning in dollars? It imposes a tax on the people
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and reduces living standards.” The Times framed that article, which expounded upon comments
by Cavallo and non-Argentine economists, as a story on investor confidence in the country, and
not an impending currency crisis.
But Cavallo had a major concern that was not unwarranted. Other economies that
devalued their currencies saw sharp upticks in poverty (e.g., Chile and Brazil). Even very fluid
exchange-rate regimes that can tolerate frequent devaluations bring with them instability and
domestic economic downturns (Frieden 2015). Cavallo knew, as did the Fund and Bank, that
abandoning the convertibility regime would spell disaster for the country, at least in the short
term. However, it is unclear through an investigation of public statements whether Cavallo and
other important actors would ever admit, prior to Argentina fully abandoning the plan in 2001,
that it was indeed the reason for the growing and unsustainable debt and deficit.
Argentina’s “Fall from Grace”
“Argentina’s fall from grace has certainly been a spectacular one”
-

Anne Krueger, First Managing Director of the IMF,
July 17, 2002

By the time Kreuger was giving the above speech to the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), the Argentine economy was contracting faster than any other economy in
Latin America. As Krueger noted, it was on track to shrink another 15-20% before the fiscal
year’s end – truly “spectacular.” But Krueger’s speech focused not on the IMF’s involvement in
the year’s leading up to the crash – indeed, she did not mention the continual servicing of
Argentina’s growing debt. Instead, she posited what the IMF could do moving forward to help
the country, noting that even having a conversation about Argentina, such as her speech, is a
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start: “I hope that the discussions here today can play some small part in that process” (Krueger
2002; transcript). But the IMF’s tune changed considerably after Argentina’s fall. The reports
previously mentioned framed Argentina as a success story, without diving deep into its mounting
debt and imbalance of payments. The IMF then spoke of Argentina as a casualty in 2001 and
beyond. The reality remains that Argentina was in large part a casualty of forces beyond its
control and deals that were not in the country’s best interest.
Given Argentina’s stellar growth throughout the 1990s, it is hard to imagine, twenty
years removed, how quickly and painfully the economy recoiled. Fanelli (2002) describes the
state of Argentina’s economy best: “The expected growth rate for 2002 is –15% and inflation is
on the rise. The peso has lost two-thirds of its value against the dollar since the replacement of
the currency board regime with a floating system. Almost half of the population is now living
under the poverty line (in 1998 the proportion of poor was 28%), and the country has defaulted
on its debt” (Fanelli 2002; 25). Cavallo’s worst fears were realized. But Cavallo knew long
before the economic crash that the convertibility plan was risky (Cavallo and Cottani 1997). In
his 1997 paper, he recognized the “exit problem” (17) in his opening remarks but went on to note
that the convertibility plan was a good idea if 1. The Argentine economy remained healthy (18)
and 2. The country continued to receive the support of the Fund (18-19). He argued that the risk
of a non-rigid exchange rate regime was simply too high for Argentina, especially since the
convertibility plan survived the worst of the Tequila Effect. He ultimately ended the paper with a
defense of convertibility over all other viable currency policy options.
On December 30, 2001, the New York Times reported that the new Argentine
government, responding to riots throughout the country, would default on an astonishing US$132
billion in loans and begin to print a new currency. Such a large default seemed almost fantastical
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at the time, leaving researchers to ask whether Argentina could weather the storm and maintain
the very foundation of itself as a country (Calomiris 2001; Teubal 2004). Especially puzzling
was the transition from the convertibility plan, propped up by the IMF, to a floating exchange
rate. The last time the country dealt with a floating exchange was the period of hyperinflation in
1989, which prompted the convertibility plan. Now, Argentina would have to find a new way to
deal with an old problem.
Debt Default and Redenomination
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the convertibility plan meant a 1-to1 exchange rate between the Argentine peso and US dollar. Thus, banks were permitted to hold
funds and debt in either denomination. Throughout the 1990s, the Argentine government went so
far as to implement a series of IMF-suggested policies that required private banks to guarantee
credit with foreign-denominated money (IMF 1995). And allowing banks to take foreigndenominated deposits allows greater banking stability and limits the chances of a bank run due to
an unsatiated demand for foreign currency (especially the US dollar) (Calvo 2001; 320-321).
When Argentina devalued the peso, it also moved to redenominate debt held in US
dollars to Argentine pesos, a move heavily debated at the time. According to Calomiris (2001),
the debt burden on both the government and private entities would have been so severe had it
been denominated in US dollars that the economy would have seen widespread illiquidity with
no obvious solution. Instead, Calomiris argues that redenomination shifted the burden of the debt
from the debtor to international banking institutions that held the debt. Calomiris contrasts
Argentina’s decision to redenominate with Mexico’s decision not to during the panic of
1994/1995. He finds that several domestic sectors that held large foreign-denominated debt
obligations recovered significantly more quickly in Argentina due to redenomination.
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It is also important to understand how the default happened in real terms. After several
negotiations with international creditors, including Suisse Bank and Chase, Argentina defaulted
only on its private loans, but continued to service its debts from the IMF (Teubal 2004; 186). It
was this commitment to IFIs that led some, like Teubal (2004), to argue that Argentina
underwent a kind of “financial valorization,” in which it followed orthodox IMF policies by-thebook at the behest of international creditors, without regard for the wellbeing of Argentines.
While Calomiris (2001) argued that redenomination necessarily saved economic institutions in
the country, Teubal (2004) argued that Argentina’s overall response to the crisis was incoherent
and brought on illegitimacy through its continued commitment to the Fund and Bank. But
Frenkel and Rapetti (2007) largely agree with Calomiris (2001). They note that, while
abandoning convertibility was painful (a fact the IMF knew and admitted to – see IMF 2003b),
redenomination and the prolongation of loan repayments helped to quickly turn the economy
around, with some signs of recovery as early as late 2002.
Once convertibility was abandoned, the Argentine national government decided on a dual
exchange-rate regime, where the peso would be pegged to the US dollar at 1.40 pesos per dollar
for certain tradable goods, and the peso would float freely on the foreign exchange market for
everything else. Importantly, the IMF decided not to negotiate with Argentina until both markets
were combined, which Argentina then did (Frenkel and Rapetti 2007; 9). Unsurprisingly, the
peso then fell against the dollar 4-to-1.
In a 2003 report, the Fund walked back much of what it said about Argentina’s
convertibility plan in the 1990s. The report noted that creditors, including the IMF, were likely
“too optimistic” about the plan originally, and that there should have been an exit strategy, as
convertibility, in hindsight, was not a plan that should have lasted for several years. It is easy to
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imagine the frustration that any non-orthodox economist recommending policy solutions to
Argentina would feel in assessing the Fund’s own misgivings years after the collapse (IMF
2003b). Argentina’s currency regime was enthusiastically backed by the Fund and kept alive
throughout the Tequila Effect, when balance of payments became severely negative, and
Argentina arguably needed to devalue its currency.
Understanding the Crisis in Terms of Dependency
As discussed extensively in chapter one, dependency theory posits that underdeveloped
regions of the world are inherently dependent upon the centers of economic progress – namely
the United States and western Europe. As I argued, there are many structuralist monetary and
currency theorists, particularly Susan Strange, Jeffry Frieden, and Louis S. Pauly, whose work is
not explicitly that of dependency theory, but who nevertheless give insight into how to study
currency and dependency together.
Dependency theory clearly lends itself to studying the 2001 currency and financial crisis
of Argentina. First, the conditions that set hyperinflation into motion in 1989 were largely
brought on by the availability of international credit in the 1970s, followed by a recoiling of
credit in the 1980s. Argentina was on an unsustainable development plan that relied heavily on
outside investments to grow the economy. Once hyperinflation set in, structural adjustment
policies followed, with the convertibility plan being the most prominent. As demonstrated
throughout this chapter, the Fund and Bank were highly supported of the convertibility plan
throughout the 1990s, while Argentina saw growth in GDP year after year.
The Tequila Effect in 1995 can be viewed one of two ways. The debacle should have
been a foreboding of the weaknesses within the convertibility plan and the need for Argentina to
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restructure its monetary policy. The IMF extended more money to Argentina to stave off a
capital accounts crisis after Mexico collapsed is not only a demonstration of endorsing and
prolonging bad policy by the IMF, but of obvious dependency of Argentina on IFIs to balance its
own books. But the dependency goes further than that. The convertibility regime and the
Currency Board were, in and of themselves, systems that kept Argentina dependent on the global
North. With the convertibility plan, Argentina’s central bank was essentially feckless. It could
not service debts through limited devaluations and quantitative easing. Indeed, it completely
deferred its entire currency policy to the IMF, in turn riding the waves of the US dollar with its
1-to-1 convertibility.
While it makes sense that the convertibility plan was an obvious boon to foreign investors
– what part of semi-dollarized stability is not to love? – the plan was a poor choice for Argentina.
As mentioned in Sharma (2002) and IMF (2003b), the crash of 2001 itself was not the only
major downside to the orthodox currency policy. The US dollar got continuously stronger
throughout the 1990s, therefore, the Argentine peso did too. Without traditional currency tools at
their disposal, the Argentines saw the strengthening currency injure the domestic economy.
While purchasing power is increased with a stronger currency, exports become noncompetitive –
and with a rigid, semi-dollarized regime, that only conflates the already dire balance of payments
and capital accounts issues. The real exchange rate, as discussed earlier, had to be actualized
somehow. Instead of easing the exchange rate, Argentina chose to hurt citizens through relative
wage deflations. Indeed, according to Rodrik (2008), wages and other non-tradable sectors rise
and fall in lieu of a currency that is able to do so. While inflation was kept to a minimum through
the plan, those that relied most on wage labor income were affected the most. Of course, when
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the actual crisis struck in 2001 it only exacerbated these underlying issues that arguably stifled
development.
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Old Problems Become New

At the start of the 21st century, the IMF appeared to be recording more losses than wins.
The 1990s saw expansive growth in the global North, but developing regions saw booms and
busts that left some countries worse off than before international financial institutions got
involved. With confidence from investors and creditors falling, the International Monetary Fund
found itself in a predicament. A once important institution of global finance and development
was increasingly seen as a pariah of poor regions, especially after several projects failed with
dire consequences, including Argentina (Momani 2006). Countries in need of cash were pivoting
away from the IMF and World Bank and instead seeking out loans from private banks. An issue
that would come to a head during the 2009 world fiscal crisis.
Argentina, dismayed by the IMF’s actions after its own collapse in 2001, was no stranger
to complex economic hardships. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the country largely paid
its debts to the IMF throughout the collapse of its economy but defaulted on primarily private
loans. This chapter focuses on Argentina’s loan default of 2014 – or as one Washington Post
reporter called it, the “weird default” (O’Brien 2014). The case of 2014 is a particularly good one
to compare to 2001, as it highlights new problems for developing economies while also touching
on longstanding issues that they have faced. Throughout this project, the role of dependency
theory has been considered when analyzing how less developed regions depend on the attention
of the developed world. Obviously, the world changed significantly from 2001 to 2014, and the
institutions that guide international finance and development changed with it. While Argentina’s
plight looks different across the two cases, it is important to investigate in what ways its plight
has changed, based on how global financial powers have shifted over the period.
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Coming out of its own economic crisis, Argentina grew significantly between 2002 and
2007, adding 6% or more to the GDP each year (Gezmis 2018). The country utilized a mix of
neoliberal and nationalistic practices to induce greater stability. As Gezmis (2018) notes, the
Argentine strategy during this time was a mix of neoliberalism and neo-developmentalism,
where the country mixed strategies from both orthodox and heterodox economic schools. The
plan was largely successful, and the country enjoyed a stable currency and growth until the world
economic shock of 2008/2009. During this period, Argentina also entered aggressive
negotiations to restructure the nature of the bonds it issued to combat the fallout of the 2001
crisis. This chapter highlights first the debt restructuring efforts of Argentina, then explains and
analyzes the eventual Argentine default of 2014, which is inextricably linked to the debt
restructuring scheme of years prior.
Debt Restructuring
After the fallout of 2001, and without much support from the Fund or Bank, Argentina
decided to restructure its sovereign debt in 2005 and 2010. It is difficult to understand the
choices made by Argentina during this period, as few other countries were navigating a similar
situation of colossal debt in the form of issued bonds. Counterfactuals are particularly difficult to
argue here, as the situation the country was in chartered relatively new territory; the Fund was no
longer an institution the Argentines – or anyone – necessarily wanted to engage. Indeed, the IMF
was so consistently wrong throughout the 1980s and 1990s on macroeconomic and currency
policy in Argentina and Latin America that it is no surprise that Latin American politicians
sought to distance themselves from IFIs altogether. However, it is important to understand the
eventual default of 2014 by investigating what preceded it, just as it was imperative to
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understand the 1990s and the period of convertibility to understand why the 2001 debt default
and currency devaluation were so dire and systemically damaging.
Argentina decided to repay its debts in 2005 and 2010 by engaging in court-mediated
settlements. In both instances, Argentina agreed to pay about 33 cents on every dollar owed to
creditors for debt it held since the 1990s. Miller and Thomas (2007) offer a helpful analysis and
argument of the initial (2005) court-mediated debt swap. They argue that a new legal
mechanism, collective action clauses (CACs), were an essential tool to safeguard debtors’ rights
while satisfying a majority of bondholders seeking compensation. While their argument is
nuanced and compelling, it fails the test of time. Their own analysis reveals how such
mechanisms ultimately played out to be ineffectual, and how very little creditors and global
North governments care about the rights of debtor countries, even when such disregard costs
developing countries long term economic development.
Collective Actions Clauses were a way to avoid vulture creditors – or creditors seeking
the full repayment of their original bonds held – from holding out and demanding more money
from debtor countries. In other words, if debtor countries could come to an agreement with a
court – typically the Southern District of New York (SDNY) – and a supermajority of
bondholders agreed to the reduced payment, then no single creditor could hold out (Miller and
Thomas 2007). In 2005, Argentina agreed to payout debtholders at 33% of the total value of the
bonds they held under a CAC, also known as a “haircut,” assisted by the SDNY. Vulture funds,
or those seeking to hold out for the entire repayment of the bonds they held, were a major
potential problem and an obstacle to developing countries relieving their debt burden. CACs, as
argued by Miller and Thomas (2007), could mitigate the issue of vulture funds by limiting their
ability to continue to seek full repayment and protect debtor countries. This would also give
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debtor countries an avenue to repay, instead of being tempted to shirk their fiduciary
responsibility to their creditors. Of course, vulture funds may not be the only problem to
restructuring debt. Political instability has been shown to play a role in the time-horizon for
working through debt repayments (Trebesch 2008).
But as Schumaker (2015) notes, the SDNY judge, Judge Griesa, interpreted the CACs as
applying to all the different bonds issued, and not separate CACs for separate bond issuances. In
reality, precedence shows that CACs are typically only good for single bond issuances and
cannot be used as blanket agreements, especially when single bondholders never initially agreed
to such a clause. While the vast majority of holdouts could not seek damages, a small group of
financial institutions in the United States continued to press for the full repayment of the bonds
held, essentially skirting the CAC interpretation of Judge Griesa but still not receiving their full
payments.
Whether or not a contractual approach is the right way for debtor countries to restructure
their debt, CACs and parallel clauses do come with some benefits. For one, it is common for
debtor countries to issue bonds to hundreds or thousands of financial entities. Therefore, any
given bondholder has little incentive to seek payments in court when a single creditor can hold
only a little pressure on the debtor country. Furthermore, CACs provide a way for these multiple,
often heterogeneous debt holders to organize as a group with minimal transaction costs in
requesting payment, especially when holding out for higher payment likely would not yield more
money being paid out (Lanau 2011). It makes sense that CACs gained both popularity and
notoriety in the years after countries ran up large bond debts. However, as we will investigate in
the remaining chapter, the CACs afforded to Argentina were not successful in keeping vulture
funds at bay, and Argentina did, eventually, suffer more economic hardship due to the court’s
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inability to protect it as a debtor with significant stakes riding on the outcome of the restructuring
litigation.
Settling sovereign debt in court is an interesting yet disturbing trend. Instead of allowing
neoliberal market mechanisms to solve the issues associated with sovereign debt, entering
litigation is a contentious and litigious method. It is unclear in the Argentina cases of 2005 and
2010 whether settling and restructuring debt was beneficial to the debtor and creditor, or if one
got a better deal out of the bargain. If the post-Bretton Woods era was marked by significant
intervention in international financial structures by the Fund and Bank, the start of the 21 st
century, witnessing spectacular fiscal and market failures in Argentina and other countries, saw a
financial structure that was swiftly being molded and reconfigured in the court rooms of
Manhattan and London.
Pari Passu and the 2014 Default
By 2014, vulture funds had taken Argentina to court in the United States numerous times
demanding full repayment of their bonds. A small contingent of vulture funds – mostly hedge
funds – took Argentina to court 11 times, winning each case (Liptak 2014). Matt O’Brien (2014)
of the Washington Post explained that Judge Griesa, after years of litigation, ruled in 2012 that
the pari passu clause of the bond agreements – in which all bondholders must be treated
approximately the same – meant that the holdouts must be repaid at the original obligation. This
could also mean that those willing to take the haircut could sue for full reimbursement too.
On June 16, 2014, the New York Times reported that Argentina appealed to and lost two
cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. On the first count, Argentina simply asked the
court to overturn Judge Griesa’s interpretation of the pari passu clause, arguing that vulture
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funds holding out for full repayment did not need to be paid in full since some 93% of
bondholders took either the 2005 or 2010 deal. The second argument dealt with the court’s
interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Argentina argued that it would
be improper for the court to issue subpoenas allowing banks to investigate Argentine assets
around the world for potential seizure if the country could not pay its debts. The court interpreted
the FSIA as blocking discovery of assets of a sovereign state only if those assets are of a military
nature and in the employ of a military regime. Delivering the majority opinion against Argentina,
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote: “That is the last of the Act’s immunity-granting sections. There is
no third provision forbidding or limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign
judgment debtor’s assets” (NML v Argentina 2014).
Argentina’s lawyers argued to both the Southern District of New York and the Supreme
Court that the country would likely suffer a default if not issued relief in court. All courts were
unsympathetic. On 30 July 2014, Argentina defaulted on $20bn in debt because it failed to make
a $539mn interest payment (Patton 2014). Argentina defaulted on all its debts, including those it
owed from the 2005 and 2010 restructurings. As the Washington Post (2014) noted, the default
happened not because the country could not pay the amount owed, but because doing so would
open it up to the liability of paying several billion more dollars, undoing the work of years of
litigating down the debt with other bondholders, and exposing it to financial risk it could not
fathom taking on. Therefore, Argentina saw its best interest in not paying the holdouts. Under
Judge Griesa’s ruling, Argentina must pay all its reduced bonds and the full bonds of the
holdouts. If it could not do both, it would be forced to do neither (Schumacher 2015; 145).
The default leads to several important questions, especially for structural and dependency
scholars. First, is a court-mediated path to debt restructuring the right one, especially when it is a
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sovereign country versus a group of hedge funds? It is likely not. The poor implementation of
CACs highlights how the federal US court system was ill-equipped to mediate and rule on cases
of this size and scope, which ultimately threatened the sovereignty, autonomy, and development
of Argentina due to the unrelenting fight of a small group of US-based hedge funds (Muse-Fisher
2014).
Some practical reforms could be made in this specific case of debt restructuring, which
might also be helpful in future agreements. CACs could be applied more universally and with
more teeth. Pari passu clauses could inversely be reduced to not allow vulture funds to hound
bond issuers in the way NML Capital and others did to Argentina (Schumacher 2015). However,
shifting clauses to change contract agreements in ways that limit the financial exposure of
governments and the power of bondholders might miss a larger point. Taking a step away from
the minutiae of the court proceedings and the eventual, odd default of Argentina in 2014, it
seems rather striking that in 13 short years, Argentina could go from a crisis involving an IMFbacked currency board with led to an economic, financial, and monetary collapse, to being
handed multiple losses in a Supreme Court of a foreign country for bonds it issued to dig itself
out of the original crisis.
Chapter one highlighted globalization’s effect on the financial situation of developing
countries. Certainly, the IMF as an institution of a globalizing world is an actor that is not
difficult to understand from a theoretical and practical standpoint. It has not been a uniquely
difficult challenge to document and critique the actions of the Fund in the case of Argentina.
However, the mix of IFI actions and US court decisions separately leading to two defaults of a
sovereign country should raise some alarms to structuralists and anyone else who values the
sovereignty and autonomy of countries. Debt defaults, as will be discussed, bring second and
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third order effects that countries cannot easily control. In the case of 2014, the United States
legal system essentially handed the default to Argentina. Hebert and Schreger (2016) note that, in
the Argentine case, the default had negative consequences for the real exchange rate and the
returns of Argentine firms.
There are several normative arguments for keeping sovereign debt defaults out of US
courts. When investors make bets by buying the bonds of developing countries, they take on a
certain amount of risks. First, if hedge funds know that they can challenge these countries in the
US court system and win, they have little reason not to buy cheap bonds with the future prospect
of beating the country in multiple court cases later. But that issue, while it is legitimate, can be
solved by tightening the contractual shortcomings of the original bond agreements. While some
might argue there is a moral hazard if countries can issue bonds and not pay them, or give
significant “haircuts” after issuing, the same could be said for vulture funds that know they can
browbeat these countries in US courts. Hedge funds that operate around the world, taking on
debt of struggling countries, should not be shielded by the promise of having their disagreements
settled in the court of a single country in which they are headquartered. Instead, the issue of
failing to repay bonds by developing countries is a supranational issue and ought to be dealt with
by a multinational coalition of governments that have the best interests of the developing regions
in mind, not profit-seeking vulture funds forcing these countries into default.
It is difficult to argue that Argentina did not live up to the pari passu clause of the bond
agreements, given that it was not withholding payment to the over 90% of creditors that agreed
to the two bond swaps. Instead, the irresponsibility falls on the US courts, and Judge Griesa in
particular, for forcing Argentina to comply with the requests of a small minority of bondholders
acting predatorily. Oncu and Vilches (2015) argue that the US court system proved to be
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“ineffectual” in mediating the debt restructuring of Argentina, given that it essentially ended in
default. But they go a step further, arguing that this was not a default in the typical sense.
Instead, they argue that US private contract law forced Argentina to avoid paying the vulture
funds, which led to a breakdown in public law. Judge Griesa’s decision to freeze payment to the
majority stakeholders who agreed to take the haircut was a massive misstep and judicial
overreach. While this is all true, it also redoubles my overarching point: the issues of debt
repayment by a sovereign country ought not to be settled in the domestic court of another
country. As Oncu and Vilches note, it would make little sense to citizens of the United States to
have our own economy impacted because a judge in a Chinese court room asserted Chinese law
over our sovereign debts.
Where was the Fund?
“… structural adjustments? That was before my time. I have no idea what it is. We do not do that
anymore.” – Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Director – April 12, 2014 – IMFC Press Briefing
While the discussion of CACs and massive debt restructuring is central to the practical
story of Argentina’s eventual 2014 debt default, the story to this point does not emphasize the
role of the IMF or World Bank. Interestingly, this is because both were intentionally absent on
the world stage throughout this period. As Miller and Thomas (2007) note, the Fund saw
Argentina as “too big to fail” throughout the 1990s, limiting its own conditionalities it placed on
the country, with Argentina settling all its IMF debt obligations by 2006 (1495-1496). Others
have referred to the failures of the IMF in Argentina, Asia, and Turkey resulting in a “crisis of
confidence” (Momani 2006; 40). Nevertheless, the Fund did not play an advisory or surveillance
role in the debt restructuring of 2005, nor did it extend any new lines of credit to Argentina
during that time (Miller and Thomas 2007). The Fund’s technocratic culture meant staff
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members played an outsized role in crafting conditionality agreements with debtor countries.
Furthermore, realistic political concerns were often ignored by IMF staff, who opted to do what
was, in their view, theoretically optimal versus what was often politically practical (Momani
2006). Pair this with the reality that taking IMF loans can negatively affect incumbent
executives’ reelection chances in democratic countries (Williams 2012). It seems odd that the
Fund could shift from thinking Argentina was too big to fail to essentially completely removing
itself from the country’s financial affairs after the 2001 crash. It does not seem possible to say
whether the shift of Argentina’s from IMF reliance to court-mediated debt restructuring is one
that signals a larger shift in the global financial structure, although researchers have noted the
explosion of court-mediated debt restructurings and defaults after the Argentine economic and
currency collapse of 2001 (Schumacher, Enderlein, and Trebesch 2018).
The global economic crisis of 2008/2009, falling between the Argentine debt
restructurings of 2005 and 2010, was a conduit of IMF reform. Throughout the 2000s,
researchers discussed the needed reforms to the IMF, as noted above. Many emerging markets
and developing countries saw the IMF as illegitimate after so many failed macroeconomic
policies and failures to properly predict impending economic crises given its outsized
surveillance role. In 2010, the Fund reformed itself, receiving more money from the G-20 and
reshuffling its structure with the hope of engaging with more practicality emerging markets and
developing countries (Lesage et al., 2013). But the reforms of 2010 did not materialize into any
help for Argentina, nor did it help to right the wrongs that the IMF had inflicted upon it and other
developing countries in the decades prior. Instead, Lesage et al. (2013) argue that the resurfacing
of the Fund after the world economic crisis was a product of institutional neoliberal policy
preference by the global North.
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Although the IMF reemerged after the 2009 financial crisis as a renewed actor in
international finance, there has been debate on whether it has lived up to its new marketing. As
Director Lagarde noted in 2014, conditionality was, to her office, a thing of the past. She argued
throughout press conferences and in policy briefings that the new, post-crisis IMF was worried
more with flexible policy options, clear-eyed recommendations, and smart data surveillance.
This supposed restructuring of the Fund would likely have been a boon to Argentine interests, as
the country still dealt with the ghosts of its 2001 default and currency devaluation. However,
Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King (2016) find that the “new” IMF touted new reforms but practiced
old policy. Indeed, conditionalities on loans had not decreased since the Fund reemerged as a
globally important financial actor. The “new” IMF was concerned with its image, but it was
apparently unconcerned with finding new ways to solve reoccurring problems in the developing
world.
This realization leads to two points. First, the Fund knew well before the 2009 global
financial crisis that its own legitimacy was declining rapidly as it tried and failed to reshape
developing economies. As Momani (2006) noted, technocratically-minded IMF programs were
ill-equipped to deal with political realities of developing countries, especially democracies.
There was a real and important gap between the crafting of theoretically sound fiscal and
monetary policies with the practical implementation of those policies. Momani (2006) argued
boldly that not only should the executive board of the Fund be replaced, but the technocratic staff
workers who consistently and egregiously overshot technical policies ought to be ousted as well.
Reframing themselves as a “new” global actor, the Fund knew to some extent that their previous
policies were a source of their loss of legitimacy; however, they seemingly rebranded without
changing any of the ingredients of their product.
48

As noted earlier, Argentina paid off its IMF obligations in 2006, ending its need for
surveillance (Miller and Thomas 2007). Which meant the IMF seemingly no hand in the bond
swaps of 2005 and 2010. But that is precisely the point, after the Fund treated Argentina as “too
big to fail,” propping the country up in the 1990s by offering loans to alleviate balance of
payments crises, it essentially walked away from the country once its debts had been satisfied
after the 2001 collapse. One would imagine that the Fund, given its self-marketed technical
prowess, would offer to mediate between Argentina and private creditors. Instead, that job fell on
the courts. While this thesis has been especially critical of the Fund’s actions and remains
committed to the view that Fund-backed policies ultimately led to the 2001 economic collapse, it
does also seem that the Fund had an obligation to Argentina after the country repaid its debts. If
the fund is as good at monitoring financial and currency situations as it constantly claims to be, it
could likely have offered helpful technical assistance when Argentina began to restructure its
bonds – or it could have, at minimum, participated in the conversation and used its political clout
to push the discussion into an international sphere instead of the United States court system. As
an IFI, the Fund has a responsibility to guide the course of new developments. Put simply, it was
wrong for the IMF to not attempt to push the Argentine debt restructuring away from the US
court system.
Not without Sin or, what is Old is New Again
To this point, this thesis has focused primarily on the external structures that have
contributed to the 2001 and 2014 defaults and currency devaluations in Argentina. What we have
not discussed is the amount of blame that should be placed on the macroeconomic policies of the
country. Certainly, Argentina is not without fault. Thomas and Cachanosky (2015) argue that
macroeconomic policies leading up to 2014 placed Argentina in a precarious situation, which
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may have contributed to the country’s decision not to make its interest payment. The authors
note that the “dirty float” of the currency did not match inflation, thus appreciating the exchange
rate and harming the domestic economy. The official exchange rate was devalued in early 2014
but it was likely too late to make major adjustments ahead of the default later that year.
Furthermore, balance of payments disparities meant that the central bank had to sell foreign
currencies to alleviate pressure on the economy, shaking foreign investor confidence and
Argentine firms alike.
There is no doubt that domestic factors played significant roles in both the 2001 and 2014
defaults and economic crises. This thesis does not argue that domestic economic factors, or
national-level economic policymaking did not contribute broadly to the economic turmoil in
Argentina in both cases. However, two issues must be remembered. First, as chapter one
highlighted, dependency theory does not discount domestic factors of dependency, or domestic
issues that might be separate from the dependent that underdeveloped regions have on developed
regions. Instead, domestic problems can exist in tandem with the dependency structures that exist
supranationally, and these internal and external problems may sometimes have significant
overlap. In the case of Argentina, there are certainly internal and external factors that have
contributed broadly to the economic problems the country faces. This thesis is most concerned
with those external factors, however. Mapping the dependency of Argentina on external
processes – the Fund’s externalities or the Supreme Court’s ruling on FSIA – cannot be left out
of the conversation. In the case of Thomas and Cachanosky (2015), the authors argue that
external factors are overblown, and that the Argentine policymaking leading up to 2014 set the
country on a path of default. But taking such an angle and emphasizing the internal and
downplaying the external cuts the story short.
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It should be evident throughout these chapters that the internal issues that Argentina
faced were due in part to the external constraints that were placed upon it. It would be wrong to
argue that the convertibility regime implemented to stave off hyperinflation was an internal
mechanism, as it was backed by the Fund. Since it also pegged the peso to the dollar and
essentially opened the Argentine economy up to greater trading, it was also a boon for outside
investors. Indeed, the convertibility regime seemed better suited for those wanting to take
advantage of the opportunities Argentina had to offer economically from the outside in, and not
so much for the sake of Argentina itself, or its internal economic needs. Furthermore, the Fund
propping up the regime and allowing the country to run up a significant debt, which eventually
led to the 2001 default, was extraordinarily irresponsible and a function of bad decision making
on both the part of the Fund and the Argentine policymakers – an example of internal and
external issues meshing.
The storied history of the IMF in Argentina does not end here. After the default of 2014,
Argentina saw rising exchange rate instability, shrinking GDP, and balance of payments
concerns, which ultimately led to the democratic ousting of incumbent President Mauricio Macri
in 2019 (Murillo and Rodrigo-Zarazaga 2020; Congressional Research Service 2020). The year
before, Argentina’s macroeconomic situation became so dire that it reestablished relations with
the IMF, gaining access to another US$57 billion, with US$7.1 billion upfront (IMF 2018). In
Argentina’s Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), and
Technical Memorandum of Understanding (see IMF 2018), the country essentially agreed to the
amount of surveillance and conditionalities of the loan program ex ante. For example, Argentina
proposed limited foreign exchange swaps by its central bank, only changing foreign reserves if
the exchange rate between the Argentine Peso and US Dollar becomes too wide (IMF 2018; 6).
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It is unclear whether the 2018 deal between the Fund and Argentina will pan out any
differently than the 2001 to 2014 saga. According to a September 2020 article by Bronstein,
Bianchi and Jourdan for Reuters, Argentina struck yet another massive debt restructuring
agreement, with CACs that including some 99% of creditors, avoiding a default on hundreds of
billions of dollars in loans. The article cites Blackrock and Fidelity as some of the investors
seeking a deal but does not mention if any of the old vulture funds, like NML Capital, were
among the holdouts. Unless CACs have been fundamentally strengthened – and there is no
indication of it – then there is a real chance that the current debt restructuring process could play
out much like 2014. As Oncu and Vilches (2015) argue of the 2014 “default,” the current
situation could place Argentina in a position where it will “default” on loans in the most
technical sense due to another pari passu ruling, but without the major repercussions or market
shocks of a typical default because the real situation in terms of dollars and cents is incongruent
with investor demands for repayment.
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Conclusion
This thesis has tried to do a lot in a short amount of time. The conversation herein
meandered from currency and monetary policy, to a long and flowing recent history of Argentine
economic crises. While many authors, most not mentioned here, highlight the importance of bad
decision-making on the part of Argentina, this thesis attempts to, in some degree, right the ship.
While I cannot argue that Argentina is without fault, as noted in chapter three, there is a rich set
of literature and data that exist which support the theories that one might develop if looking at
Argentina’s woes through a dependency lens.
This thesis attempted to use case analysis and process tracing to better understand how
global structures, particularly the IMF as an institution, affect the way Argentina has dealt with
economic shocks, chosen monetary policy, and attempted to develop. It seems undeniable that,
given the decades-long reality of a swiftly globalizing world, Argentina has relied upon the
credit and participation of global North entities – the Fund, private investors, and even Justice
Antonin Scalia – to choose policy options congruent with an inextricably linked world economy
and financial system. While scholars are never wrong to investigate domestic determinants of
Argentina’s issues, there must be at least a small subset of researchers who are dedicated to
exploring and explaining the reality of economic issues in the developing world in the context of
global structures. This thesis intentionally stepped away from conversations relating to the role
of domestic level Argentine policies, instead focusing on Argentina’s interactions with the global
structure. I argue here that though there is not a long discussion on domestic policy, the
relationship between the global structures, and how those structures result in policy constraint on
a developing country, cannot be pulled apart from domestic policy – they go together.
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As demonstrated in chapter one, there are more opponents to dependency theory than
proponents. I made the argue then, which should be bolstered through reading this work, that
dependency theory is more nimble and influential than just the pieces that came out of Latin
American universities in the 1960s and 1970s. I argue that much of the language and thinking of
dependency theory has been rebranded and used by structuralists to examine the issues that I
have investigated here. this is evident in some critical analysis. For example, in analyzing the
IMF and global North hegemony, Mueller (2011) states: “While there has been a resurgence of
interest in the Fund in the international political economy (IPE) literature in the past decade, the
nature of this work is to question outcomes, rather than presuppositions and definitions” (Mueller
2011; 378). Mueller is in the minority of scholars challenging our assumptions of international
institutions, instead of chasing data and specific policy outcomes. The bigger picture could be
better understood by thinking like Mueller; more work ought to focus on the big picture of big
institutions and whether we need to step back and how far back we should go. This thesis aims to
be just a short example of doing such work.
Other scholars are proposing big, normative changes to world power structures. Desai
and Vreeland (2011) argue that there ought to be regional monetary funds instead of one large
IMF. They contend that economic interdependence is greatest at the regional level and that
cooperation among countries is likeliest at this level too. Their argument also makes sense from a
dependency perspective, as dependency theory at its core looks not at the dynamics of specific
countries, but the dynamics between developed and underdeveloped regions. This thesis looks at
one country and its tribulations, but hopefully the content here can make a case that these power
structures exist across political borders and regions. Indeed, countries around the world that deal
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with the Fund and private creditors with the same regularity as Argentina likely face similar
problems.
Comparing 2001 to 2014
In many ways, this thesis is one continuous story, starting in 1989 and ending today. The
two cases studied, the Argentine default of 2001 and of 2014 are essentially one larger story, but
it is not a seamless timeline. The greatest difference in the two defaults might highlight a bigger
trend in the world. Fund actions in the 1990s, including the convertibility regime and the
constant subsidizing of debt to keep the regime fluid, played an outsized role in the 2001 default.
The 2014 looked very different. It was a product of years of court-mediated debt restructuring
attempts, ending with the Supreme Court of the United States handing Argentina two appellate
defeats and upholding the lower court decision to block Argentina from making some payments
instead of all.
It is difficult to say if the case of Argentina demonstrates a changing role of global
financial structures, or if it simply reaffirms structures that have been in place for several
decades. The IMF’s role in the 2001 default is well understood; however, the Fund was not in
Argentina from 2006, when the country paid off its Fund debts, until they negotiated a new loan
program in 2018. While we have acknowledged the attempted “changes” made to the Fund after
2009, the 2018 agreement did not look like a revamped IMF ready to give up its stance on
conditionalities.
The two main power players in the study of Argentina have been the Fund and the US
court system. It is almost baffling to think that the IMF has played a large part in harming
Argentina, as it propped up a failing convertibility regime which led to a massive default; then,
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the US courts offered up another hit to Argentina’s economy with a default that was precipitated
by the issuing of bonds from the first default. One major takeaway from this study, which is not
readily available in the literature yet is congruent with a dependency perspective, is the crisis of
legitimacy of both the IMF when it fails to help countries, and the crisis of sovereignty of a
country when the United States courts can essentially hand it a default through US domestic
legal action. These two issues are the crux of this thesis because they do not just demonstrate
dependency, but the awful effects that dependency has on dependent, underdeveloped regions.
US courts are not the proper forum for debt restructuring and the IMF, if it must be the vehicle
through which countries in the global South attain credit, it must not be tied so inextricably to the
interests of global North capitalists.
In closing, this thesis aimed to apply theory to the practical issues of Argentina default
and currency devaluation. The current conversation in the academic literature is situated
predominately in quantitatively assessing the economic outcomes of specific policy options.
However, there is room and need for a return to theory, of understanding that the global power
structures ought to be challenged, and that academic work can push the policy conversation in
new directions. I argue that dependency theory still has explanatory validity and that it was
underutilized for the brief time that it was in vogue. Instead of being a temporal phenomenon
within academia, dependency theory is instead a way of viewing the global structures that
partially determine what developing countries can do on their own and in tandem with the
developed world.
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